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Rachel Danielle Beeman*
Introduction
When one uses a retinal, fingerprint, or face-scan to unlock your smartphone, your phone
has now stored this biometric data. When you set up your phone, you choose to provide this
information to the phone and know, even if not explicitly, that the phone is storing this data. 1
Social media companies like Facebook and TikTok can scan the photos and videos you upload to
create and store facial templates. Most users did not, but when Illinois passed the first-ever
regulation on biometric data, the battle for privacy and social media began. Illinois’ Biometric
Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) enacted in 2008, sparked a group of Facebook users to file a
class-action suit against Facebook.2 The users allege Facebook collected and stored their
biometric data “in the form of face scans without [ ] prior notice or consent” and harvested the
scans for its “Tag Suggestions” program to encourage user tagging.3 What is even more
frightening about this is that this litigation involved algorithms from 2008; today, these facial
scanning algorithms are becoming increasingly accurate. 4

* Rachel Danielle Beeman, Seton Hall Law J.D. Candidate, 2022; Honors College and B.A. in Political Science and
Philosophy, Seton Hall University, 2018; M.P.A. concentrating in Non-Profit Management, Seton Hall University,
2019. I would like to thank my fiance who has supported me during this process while deployed and s erving his
country in Iraq.
1 See Jason Cipriani, iPhone Face ID Is Pretty Cool. Here’s How it Works and How toUse It, C|NET , (Feb. 5, 2020
6:00 AM) https://www.cnet.com/how-to/the-iphone-and-ipads-face-id-tech-is-pretty-darn-cool-heres-how-it-worksand-how-to-use-it/ (stating that during the initial setup of Face ID, the phone “converts your face map to a 2D image
that it uses as a master key,” and every time after initial set up compares your face “with the master key it created.”).
2 In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation, No. 15-cv-03747-JD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151269, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020)
3 Id.
4 See Olivia Solon, Facial Recognition’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Millions of Online Photos Scraped without Consent ,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019) https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/facial-recognition-s-dirty-little-secret-millionsonline-photos-scraped-n981921 (in order for these algorithms to improve, they must be “fed hundreds of thousands
of images of diverse array of faces” and what is more concerning is that “these people’s faces are bein g used without
their consent, in order to power technology that could eventually be used to surveil them”).
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Recently, California passed and began to enforce new privacy protections with the
California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) in 2018, which became effective in January of
2020.5 With the additional legislation, a group of parents filed a class action against TikTok
under both BIPA and CCPA, alleging unauthorized use of their minor child’s biometric data.6
As litigation begins to increase against social media companies, users appear to be rallying their
legislatures to act to protect their biometric data. Some scholars refer to this time as a
“constitutional moment for the United States,” arguing that the increased litigation should be a
call to action for Congress to pass a federal statute.7 This Comment argues, however, that state
legislatures should lead the way. State legislatures can offer citizens a private right of action
against companies that use and store biometric data without notifying users or receiving express
consent. Though the federal government arguably can offer similar relief, state legislatures face
fewer procedural stalling and hurdles in comparison to those Congress faces.8
There are currently four states that have biometric data-specific statutes: Texas,
Washington, California and Illinois. Illinois enacted the first biometric statute on the books and
offers the most comprehensive private right of action.9 California’s statute has a private right of

5

California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE tit. 1.81.5 § 1798.100-199 (2018) [hereinafter CCPA]
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?division=3.&part=4.&lawCode=CIV&title=1.81.5
(amended Sept. 25, 2020).
6 See Compl. G.R. v. TikTok, Inc.; Compl. P.S. v. TikTok, Inc.
7 Woodrow Hartzog and Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61
Boston College L.R. 1687, 1688 (2020).
8 See e.g. Bill Keating, U.S. Representative 9th Distr. of Mass., The Legislative Process, (last visited Nov. 11, 2020)
https://keating.house.gov/policy-work/legislative-process (“After a bill is introduced and referred to the committee
of jurisdiction, the committee will often send the measure to its specialized subcommittee(s) for study, hearings,
revisions, and approval.”). This is only one step in the long procedure to getting a federal bill passed, which
includes holding a public hearing for input. Part IV of this Comment will discuss the flaws of this process in more
depth.
9 See Jeffrey N. Rosenthal and David J. Oberly, Biometric Privacy in 2020: The Current Legal Landscape, LAW
360, (Feb. 3, 2020) https://www.law360.com/articles/1239794/biometric-privacy-in-2020-the-current-legallandscape (noting that BIPA “is generally considered the most stringent of all state laws because it is the only
biometric privacy law to provide a private right of action.”). Th e Rosenthal article was written prior to the
enactment of the CCPA, which also provides for a private right of action, albeit less comprehensive than BIPA.
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action, but it is limited and only available under specific breach scenarios. 10 This Comment
focuses on the California and Illinois statutes but takes note that Texas, Washington, New York,
and Arkansas have either announced new legislation or have altered their current laws to
encompass biometric data privacy.11
This comment proposes that states should pass a specific and comprehensive biometric
data privacy law that (1) allows for a private right of action with statutory damages similar to
those seen in BIPA, and (2) details the notice requirements of private corporations to users, prior
to their use and collection of the data and services. The legislation, passed in each state would
ideally allow plaintiffs to bring claims against social media companies who collect, use and store
their biometric data without their express and informed consent. Part I discusses what facial
recognition technology is and how it is used both generally and by social media companies. Part
II discusses the important privacy implications of biometric data, specifically facial recognition,
and why the public should care about this kind of regulation. Part III presents the current legal
landscape for biometric privacy at both the federal and state levels, noting that no federal law
exists explicitly regulating or protecting biometric data. Part IV discusses the theories
underlying opting in versus opting out settings, and the language of notice and consent forms.
Part V argues for state legislation as the solution over federal legislation given the inefficiency of
the federal legislative process’ and the ability for state legislation to provide a more targeted

10

See Mark S. Melodia et al., Litigating the CCPA in Court, H OLLAND & KNIGHT LLP (July 22, 2020),
https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2020/07/litigating-the-ccpa -in-court (“[T]he law expressly provides
that a private right of action is available only for certain data breach incidents ‘and shall not be based on violations
of any other section of’ the CCPA.”); see also CCPA, supra note 5, at § 1798.150(c) (“The cause of action
established by this section shall apply only to violations as defined in subdivision (a) and shall not be based on
violations of any other section of this title.”).
11 Natalie Prescott, The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What U.S. Companies Need to Know in 2020 , M INTZ , P.C.,
(Jan. 15, 2020) https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2826/2020-01-15-anatomy-biometric-laws-whatus-companies-need-know-2020 (“[F]ive other states (Texas, Washington, California, New York and Arkansas) have
now passed their own biometric statutes or expanded existing laws to include biometric identifiers.”).
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approach for consumers. Further, this part briefly outlines the template that state legislatures
should follow based on the current state legislative landscape regarding facial recognition.
Finally, Part VI provides a conclusion and discusses how the European biometric data law may
also provide some insight into how state legislators should respond.
I. Facial Recognition Technology Today
First, this section will introduce how facial recognition technology works generally.
Then, it will move into how social media companies utilize this technology. Specifically, this
section will focus on how Facebook and TikTok deploy increasingly accurate and complex
algorithms that scan users’ uploaded images without users’ express consent.
A. How Does Facial Recognition Technology Work Overall?
The typical association with facial recognition technology is likely law enforcement
agencies. Generally this technology is defined as a method of identifying or verifying the
identity of an individual using their face and can be used to identify people in photos, videos, or
in real-time.12 One method law enforcement may employ is to use their mobile devices during a
stop.13 For example, the application allows officers to put in photos of individuals suspected of a
crime and search for other potential images of that face on the web.14 This power and the
criticism the platform has received is likely why the company itself has begun to institute new
compliance measures including, requiring the officer to input a specific case number.15
Clearview AI and its connection to facial recognition and social media will be discussed in more

12

Electronic Frontier Foundation, Street-Level Surveillance (last updated Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter EFF]
https://www.eff.org/pages/face-recognition.
13 Id.
14 See Heather Somerville, Facial-Recognition Startup Clearview Moves to Limit Risk of Police Abuse, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL , (Oct. 20, 2020, 3:56 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/facial-recognition-startup-clearviewmoves-to-prevent-possible-police-abuse-11603217327.
15 Id.
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depth later in this Comment.16 Facial recognition technology is rapidly advancing not only
among law enforcement but, more importantly, in connection with social media companies that
are improving algorithms and deploying facial recognition for multiple uses.17
In general, facial recognition systems “use computer algorithms to pick out specific,
distinctive details . . . [like] distance between the eyes or shape of the chin, [ ] then convert
[these measurements] into [ ] mathematical representation[s]” where the data collected is a face
template.18 A face template is unique, and “distinct from a photograph because it’s designed to
only include certain details that can be used to distinguish one face from another.”19 For
example, the image below is from a United States Department of Commerce short question and
answer, which “reverse engineered” face templates to facial scans with 93% accuracy. 20

Reconstructed Images (illustration), in Michelle Chibba and
Alex Stoianov, On Uniqueness of Facial Recognition Templates,
NTIA U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE , Info. Privacy Comm’r.’s
Office of Ontario, Canada (March 2014).

16

See infra Section II C.
See generally Thales Group, Facial Recognition: Top 7 Trends (Tech, Vendors, Markets, Use Cases and Latest
News), THALES GROUP, (last visited Nov. 12, 2020) (updated Sept. 12, 2020)
https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/facial-recognition,
(discussing how various companies, including Facebook, use algorithms for facial recognition that are increasingly
accurate). The article specifically discussed Facebooks DeepFace Program, which was launched in 2014, and can
“determine whether two photographed faces belong to the same person, with an accuracy rate of 97.25%.” Id. This
is especially impressive because humans correctly answer this same question in 97.53% of cases. Id.
18 EFF, supra note 12.
19 Id.
20 Michelle Chibba and Alex Stoianov, On Uniqueness of Facial Recognition Templates, NTIA U.S. DEPT . OF
COMMERCE , Info. Privacy Comm’r.’s Office of Ontario, Canada (March 2014)
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uniqueness_of_face_recognition_templates_ -_ipc_march-2014.pdf.
17

5

Although one can see that these reconstructions are not exact replicas in the way that a
photograph would portray, these reconstructed images from the face templates should still create
unease if in the wrong hands.
As with every advancement in technology, this too comes with common problems that
are worth noting. Some computer systems “are designed to calculate a probability match score
between the unknown person and specific face templates stored in the database.”21 The
differences between most databases and algorithms are that each “vary in their ability to identify
people under challenging conditions such as poor lighting, low quality image resolution, and
suboptimal angle of view (such as in a photograph taken from above[,] looking down on an
unknown person).”22 That means that some of these programs are advanced enough to identify
someone in low-lighting scenarios, while others cannot. The question then becomes, do those
who deploy this technology, like law enforcement, know what minimum bar to set?
The most common errors are known as “false positives” or “false negatives.”23 A “false
positive” is “when the face recognition system [matches] a person’s face to an image in a
database,” but is not accurate.24 For example, “a police officer submits an image of ‘Joe,’ but the
system erroneously tells the officer that the photo is of ‘Jack.’”25 Though this is only a
hypothetical, these errors seem to demonstrate important liberty and privacy implications for the
“system error” that could harm Jack. Alternatively, a false negative occurs when a face
recognition system fails to match a person’s face to a face template that is already in the

21

EFF, supra note 12.
Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
22
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database.26 Put simply, the system will return zero results when the database may contain at least
one positive match.27
B. Facial Recognition Technology and Social Media
Understanding the scale of how facial recognition technology relates to photos uploaded
to social media may be difficult. In a 2013 white paper, Facebook reported its users had
“uploaded more than 250 billion photos,” and in 2017 estimated “that the total number of digital
photos stored in [its] electronic database was around 5 trillion.”28 While this does not tell users
what the social media giant does with this information, it does demonstrate the sheer number of
potential face templates available for “scraping.”29 One way to find out how Facebook uses this
information is by looking at its Privacy Policy. In Facebook’s Privacy Policy, it advises its users
to “consider who you choose to share with, because people who can see your activity on our
products can choose to share it with others on and off our products, including people and
business[es] outside the audience you shared with.”30 This policy appears to be Facebook’s
attempt to warn users that it cannot control how or when other users upload pictures of another
user.
Another social media application has faced recent scrutiny with its use of facial
geometric scans. TikTok, according to a recent class action, “scans a user’s facial geometry

26

See EFF, supra note 12.
Id.
28 Matthew T. Hays, Technology Defendants Continue to Test Whether the Illinois BIPA Law Can Cope with
Modern Facial Recognition Technology, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC: THE FIREWALL (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.thefirewall-blog.com/2019/12/technology-defendants-continue-to-test-whether-the-illinois-bipa -lawcan-cope-with-modern-facial-recognition-technology/.
29 For a definition of scraping see What is Data Scraping?, THE SCIENCE TIMES (May 29, 2020 11:07 PM)
https://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/25874/20200529/what-is-data-scraping.htm, (defining scraping as “an
automated technique of gathering data from the web using a scraper,” which is a technology that is programed “to
extract specific data from targeted websites”).
30 Facebook Privacy Policies, How is This Information Shared?, FACEBOOK, (last visited Sept. 22, 2020)
https://www.facebook.com/policy.php.
27
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before running an algorithm to determine the user’s age . . . [and] uses facial scans to allow users
to superimpose animated facial filters onto the moving faces of video subjects.” 31 In the Summer
of 2020 TikTok announced that for the “first time ever” it would be sharing the number of videos
that have been removed for violating platform guidelines. 32 This report, titled “Transparency
Report,” includes: how the platform handles requests for information, protects minors, and
responds to intellectual property infringement, among other things33 ; however, it does not
contain the word “biometric” anywhere and does not address the proverbial elephant in the room.
Despite this apparent transparency, it does not appear to address the recent allegations against
them.
TikTok’s alleged facial scans can have an array of uses, and looking to its privacy policy
for information reveals that the company is not explicit with how it uses this data. According to
their Privacy Policy there is certain information that they collect “automatically,” including: “IP
address, geolocation-related data (as described below), unique device identifiers, browsing and
search history (including content you have viewed in the Platform), and Cookies.”34 The Privacy
Policy does not address the recent allegations. The Plaintiffs state that TikTok uses a
“proprietary facial recognition technology [to] scan[] every video uploaded . . . for faces, extracts
geometric data relating to the unique points and contours (i.e., biometric identifiers) of each face,
and then uses the data to create and store a template . . . without” notice.35 Infringement on a
individual’s right to privacy, and their ability to know when and how their personally identifying
information is being used should not go unnoticed.

31

Compl. at 1, G.R. v. TikTok, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-04537 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2020).
Michael Beckerman, VP and Head of US Public Policy and Eric Han, Head of Safety, US, Our H2 2019
Transparency Report, TIKTOK, (July 9, 2020) https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/our-h-2-2019-transparency-report.
33 See id.
34 TikTok, Information We Collect, (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy policy?lang=en.
35 Compl. G.R. v. TikTok, at 4.
32
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What exactly are TikTok and Facebook doing with all this data that they collect on our
faces? According to TikTok’s Privacy Policy, it uses the information it collects to “infer
additional information about you, such as your age, gender, and interests,” concluding with a
catch-all phrasing “for any other purposes disclosed to you at the time we collect your
information pursuant to your consent.”36 Is TikTok referring to the mandatory “I Agree” button
presented to a user as they put in their name and contact information to register for a profile? If a
user is not presented with adequate notice regarding facial scans, social media companies like
TikTok should not be allowed to collect and store this information. Further down this page filled
with verbose legal jargon, TikTok alerts its users that they “share categories of personal
information listed above with service providers and business partners to help us perform business
operations and for business purposes, including research, payment processing and transaction
fulfillment, . . . data storage and hosting.”37 The personal information that TikTok purports to
list above appears purposefully vague, and arguably provides them with a wide range of
discretion.
II. Why We Care: Threats to Privacy
The pervasiveness of social media creates the potential that individuals will have
unwanted photos unknowingly taken of them then posted to a friend’s profile. This fear transfer
into individuals’ employment prospects and will be discussed in detail below. Finally,
individuals should concern themselves with the prevalence of facial recognition as it has
potential ominous governmental uses through law enforcement branches.

36

See the TikTok, Privacy Policy, (last visited Sept. 23, 2020) https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy -policy?lang=en
(allowing users to click the appropriate Privacy Policy depending on their location). It is especially interesting that
TikTok provides a general privacy policy for all of the United States. Id. It is curious that the company does not
reflect each of the individual state privacy regula tory standards, especially those which are require increased
consumer protections like the CCPA and BIPA.
37 Id. at How We Share Your Information (emphasis added).
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A. The Threat to User’s Image Uploads
Posting photos is more dangerous than writing a blog post or a status update because
images are arguably less in our control. Some individuals agonize over the vocabulary they use
or their word choices to ensure they do not present a negative connotation or present themselves
in a negative light. Yet photos, unlike words, can be taken at any time or place and be posted
with or without our knowledge. Then, as this Comment and other news articles have
highlighted, social media companies can scan and create facial templates of these unwanted
photos.38 With the evolution of technology and smartphones, photos taken at your friend’s BBQ
or wedding are uploaded onto Facebook or Instagram, or used as the background of a TikTok
and have become not fully within a user’s control. Social media users and their friends—
regardless of whether or not they have a profile—unknowingly give “up a part of [their] privacy,
through [their] social media activities.”39 It is even worse that job applicants are opening
themselves up to an “all-out investigation of [their] online persona.”40 Instagram and other
social media sites have been described as “a playground for sharing snapshots with friends and a
jungle of fierce competition among marketers relying on the expressive power of
photography.”41 This new “playground” creates potential negative job implications as the next
section will discuss.42

38

See Aaron Holmes, Instagram Could Face Up to $500Billion in Fines in Class-Action Lawsuit Alleging it
Illegally Harvested Biometric Data, BUSINESS I NSIDER, (Aug. 12, 2020 10:48 AM)
https://www.businessinsider.com/instagram -facing-500-billion-in-fines-in-facial-recognition-lawsuit-2020-8
(“Under the law, Facebook could be faced to pay up to $5,00 0 per violation for as many as 100 million Instagram
users, totaling half a trillion dollars at most.”). It is important to note that Instagram is owned by Facebook, which is
why the article mentions Facebook. Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10 -K), at 7 (Jan. 30, 2020).
39 See Dr. Saby Ghoshray, The Emerging Reality of Social Media: Erosion of Individual Privacy Through Cyber Vetting and Law’s Inability to Catch Up, 12 J. M ARSHALL REV. I NTELL . PROP. L. 551, 556 (2013).
40 Id.
41 Jessica Silbey, et al., Existential Copyright and Professional Photography, 95 NOTRE DAME L. R EV. 263, 264
(2019).
42 See Stella Liang, How Social Media Affects Your Chance of Getting Hired , SIMON FRASER UNIV., (Oct. 7, 2015)
http://www.sfu.ca/olc/blog/csi-blog/how-social-media-affects-your-chance-getting-hired.
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B. Employers and Social Media Investigations
As part of the hiring process, it is now common for employers to search a potential
employee’s social media profiles and platforms. Though conducted in 2015, a survey from
CareerBuilder found that over fifty-two percent of employers utilize social media profiles and
conducted searches of their candidates to determine job eligibility.43 Further, things such as
religious beliefs or marital status, not usually disclosed in an interview, get pushed from the
interview room to a simple google search.44 Social media companies give employers the
potential ability to access facial scans that it collects and stores without a candidate ever
receiving notice or giving consent. At times companies may employ background check
companies. These third-party companies “[w]idespread access to [an] individual’s online
activit[y] has changed the employment screening landscape as the search for the right
candidate . . . has transmogrified into an exercise in seeking a desirable behavioral profile.” 45
Scholars posit that social media has become the core for many employment decisions.46 Further,
the more concerning aspect of this is that while “individuals may be more reluctant” to freely
express themselves in the form of posts as employers increase their internet investigation,47 users
who do not have social media profiles may still have images uploaded of them.

43

Id.
Id. (“When it comes to sensitive topics, such as religion and marital status, the interviewers are not supposed to
ask during the interview, they will ask Google instead.”).
45 See Ghoshray, supra note 40, at 553.
46 See Ghoshray, supra note 40, at 555 (“At the core, the scenarios represent how the societal landscape is being
shaped by individuals’ immersion in social media.”).
47 See Ghoshray, supra note 40, at 576 (“If a potential employee recognizes a priori that anything he or she
expresses in a public forum could be found in a future search as part of digital data mining for d istilling patterns for
a ‘suitable’ employee, the individual will be more inclined to suppress her thoughts than to express them.”). Though
this article explores the constitutional implications and infringements on the democratic process employment
investigations pose, these implications raise awareness of the need for privacy protections overall. See id. at 556
(“[J]udges and administrators will be thrust into the unenviable role of making significant decisions regarding
people's lives and livelihoods, with only scarce legislative guidance.”).
44
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As the saying goes, a picture says a thousand words. With the ability for large social
networking sites to scan and retain biometric data and our lack of control over who posts pictures
of us, negative employment decisions may pose serious problems in the near future. 48 Despite
the important implications unwanted facial recognition and social media searches can play in
one’s career, an even eerier threat lurks within government’s potential uses.
C. Government Access and Use of this Data
This year we have seen increased scrutiny over a phone application that law enforcement
agencies use to assist with finding suspects. As of January 2020, the New Jersey Attorney
General announced an investigation into Clearview AI and banned all law enforcement officers
from using the technology.49 This announcement came in light of a New York Times article,
which alleged “Clearview had amassed a database of more than three billion photos across the
web” from scraping data from “sites like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Venmo.”50 Given the
potential for this type of data to be taken from social media profiles without notifying users or
asking for their consent, and law enforcements potential uses, stricter regulation requiring user
consent is something that everyone should be talking about.
Some law enforcement agencies have been using facial recognition technology long
before the release of Clearview AI. The oldest and largest facial recognition system in the
country is based out of Pinellas County, Florida, and has been in place for over twenty years. 51

48

See Michael J. Tews et al., The Effects of Negative Content in Social Networking Profiles on Perceptions of
Employment Suitability, 28 I NT. J. SELECT ASSESS. 17, 17 (2019) (“Given the ease of access to information and its
low cost, employers are increasingly making use of social networking sites in the context of employee selection.”).
This article continues to say that about sixty percent of employers will eliminate candidates because of perceived
negative social media profiles. Id. at 17–18.
49 Kashmir Hill, New Jersey Bans Police from Using Clearview Facial Recognition App , N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/technology/clearview-ai-new-jersey.html.
50 Id.
51 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How The Police Use Facial Recognition, and Where it Falls Short , N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/technology/facial-recognition-police.html.
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The officials in Florida stated that they use the system 4,600 times per month, but it is only
effective with clear images such as photos from anonymous social media accounts.52 Despite
this database containing access to over thirty million images some law enforcement agents argue
that the law does not require them to tell the court or the defendant’s attorney about any use of
facial recognition during an investigation.53 The most concerning part of this exposé is that a
2016 Georgetown Law study showed one in two Americans were in a law enforcement facial
recognition program,54 given Clearview AI’s recent contracts with law enforcement that number
has likely increased. Further, this is not simply a local issue, but as the study shows, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) uses individuals ‘driver’s license photos to compare the faces of
suspected perpetrators.55 Though this is a demonstration of how the FBI was using driver’s
license photos, Clearview AI was founded in 2017, and with the attack on the U.S. Capital
building in early 2021 speculation abounds as to the use of facial recognition technologies.56
Though Clearview AI and its connection to American law enforcement is a modern issue,
the government using social media to find individuals is not new. In 2009 Iran used photos to
target and identify potential protest sites.57 The government “posted photos from protests on a
website and invited citizens to identify individual faces that were singled out.” 58 If the
government had wanted, perhaps they could have uploaded the photos to Facebook, and once the

52

Id.
Id.
54 See Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya and Jonathan Frankle, “The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face
Recognition in America,” Georgetown Law: Center on Privacy & Technology (Oct. 18, 2016)
https://www.perpetuallineup.org.
55 See id.
56 See Rae Hodge, Capital Attacks: FBI Mum on Facial Recongition, Clearview AI Searches Spike , C|NET (Jan. 12,
2021 1:36 PM) https://www.cnet.com/news/capitol-attack-fbi-mum-on-facial-recognition-clearview-ai-searchesspike/ (Though the FBI has not responded to questions as to whether or not they are using facial recognition to
identify suspects, “Clearview AI has confirmed a spiek in searches of its database used by law enforcement”).
57 Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More than A Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy In Social
Networks, 26 H ARV. J. L. & TECH. 165, 167 (2012).
58 Id. at 166.
53
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“tagging” feature was in use, they may have had suggestions for who those potential suspects
were. Though facial recognition technology in 2009 was not sophisticated enough to identify
these protestors, imagine if “the government could simply match these faces against the hundreds
of billions of photos available on Facebook,” 59 or Instagram, or TikTok available today.
Facebook and Instagram used their ability to access and use our photos to “expand facial
recognition algorithms and optimize age progression technology.”60 Therefore, our data is
accessed without our permission or knowledge, and large social media companies are profiting
off users’ image and likeness without consent or knowledge.
III.

Current Legislation Regulating Biometric Data
Part III focuses on the lack of federal regulation and evaluates the current state

regulation. Specifically, this Comment focuses on the comprehensive biometric data law in
Illinois and California, and only briefly outlines both Washington and Texas laws.
A. Federal Legislation
In light of news articles circulating about facial recognition harms in association with law
enforcement in 2020, Senators Markey and Merkley, along with Congresswomen Jayapal and
Pressley, introduced the Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of
2020.61 Likely, the ACLU litigation pressured Congress with its allegations that Clearview AI
committed an “extraordinary and unprecedented violation of Illinois residents’ privacy rights . . .
seeking to profit off its use of ‘face recognition technology.’”62 Though the proposed federal bill

59

Welinder, supra note 57, at 167.
Logan Wayn and Jake Linford, Contracting for Fourth Amendment Privacy Online, 104 M INN. L. REV. 101, 102
(2019).
61 Press Release, Senators Markey And Merkley, And Reps. Jayapal, Pressley To Introduce Legislation To Ban
Government Use Of Facial Recognition, Other Biometric Technology, (June 25, 2020)
https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-markey-and-merkley-and-reps-jayapal-pressley-tointroduce-legislation-to-ban-government-use-of-facial-recognition-other-biometric-technology.
62 Compl. at 1–2, American Civil Liberties Union v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020CH04353 9337839 (May 28,
2020).
60
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does not implicate private companies, it demonstrates that citizens’ pressure through distrust and
uproar can force Congress to act. This bill is important in the context of this Comment not
because of the bill itself as most federal bills do not become law, but rather the bill acts as a clear
demonstration of the lack of speed and efficiency with which Congress can act. Prior to this
federal move, states responded more quickly, took measures into their own hands, and banned
law enforcement agencies from using facial recognition applications.63 Within the time it took to
propose the Congressional Bill, this phone application under investigation and accused of BIPA
violations received a federal contract. The Department of Homeland security and ICE
announced their partnership with this controversial app.64 The Moratorium demonstrates
litigation groups such as the ACLU’s ability to pressure legislators, but this bill would only cover
federal law enforcement agencies and a few limited state agencies. Therefore, in regard to facial
recognition and biometric data usage, private companies are still in the clear from even potential
federal regulation within the United States at this time. If citizens have the power to encourage
representatives to propose sweeping and novel legislation, the public should further demand that
social media platforms be required to provide users with notice and require affirmative consent.
B. State Legislation
A few states have passed biometric data-specific privacy laws. The trend of passing
legislation in this field as well as the constant change in the legal landscape, warrants an
argument that social media companies should merely create the most comprehensive privacy
policy to avoid having to make future changes. 65 This section, however, focuses on the current

63

See Hill, supra note 49.
Taylor Hatmaker, Clearview AI landed new facial recognition contract with ICE, TECHCRUNCH, (Aug. 14, 2020,
6:34 PM) https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/14/clearview-ai-ice-hsi-contract-2020/.
65 See generally Natalie Prescott, The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What U.S. Companies Need To Know in 2020,
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array of statutes that exist in Illinois, California, Texas, and Washington. The Illinois and
California sections discuss recent cases against social media companies Facebook and TikTok,
and the Texas and Washington subsections will focus on the statutes themselves.
1. Illinois’ Biometric Protection
Illinois was the first state legislature to specifically address biometric data when it passed
BIPA in 2008,66 and citizens did not take long to put this bill to use. First, looking at the statute
it is important to note the extensive private right of action the language of the statute gives to
aggrieved citizens. This is demonstrated through looking at BIPA in action in the settlement and
case against Facebook from 2020.
i.

The Biometric Information Privacy Act of Illinois

BIPA, in its relevant provision states that any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act
shall have a right of action and recover against any private entity that violates this Act with
increasing minimum liquidated or actual damages as the scienter requirement increases. 67
Further, a plaintiff may get reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, as well as injunctive relief
depending on what the court deems appropriate.

68

The statute provides for a private right of

action. A private right of action allows any individual who meets the statute criteria has a right
to bring a claim to court on their own.69 Illinois is the only state law to allow such a broad
private right of action. Specifically, the statute provides for X REMEDY. The other state
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statutes named herein do not provide for a private right of action, other than California, which
limits the extent of the private action to a specific subset of issues.
ii.

Facebook and BIPA

Recently, the 2008 litigation against Facebook settled. Illinois residents brought claims
against Facebook under the Illinois law yet agreed to transfer the case from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to the Northern District of California.70 The
users claimed that their biometric data was used and stored without their permission or
knowledge for the suggested tag tool.71
First, the court analyzed the plaintiff’s standing in the case. Under federal law, a plaintiff
has standing to bring suit if they can show: “(1) they suffered an actual, concrete injury in fact;
(2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood
that injury will be redressed by a favorable decisions.”72 In this case, the court concluded the
plaintiffs “alleged a concrete and actual injury in fact under BIPA that was sufficient to confer
standing.”73 The Ninth Circuit reached a decision interpreting BIPA in a favorable light to
plaintiffs.74
The court in In re Facebook Biometric Infor. Priv. Litig. approved to an amended
settlement agreement, 75 which it entered in August of 2020.76 The settlement prior settlement in
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See In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation , 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1158. (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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June received criticism from U.S. District Judge James Donato, charged with overseeing the
case, as “woefully inadequate” and “too little in the long run.”77 This criticism is important to
emphasize within this Comment because it demonstrates that while a remedy through the
judiciary may be a good way to “scold” a multi-billion-dollar company, it is likely not enough.
Therefore, instituting new regulatory requirements on a state-by-state basis would like to have
more impact.
The specifics of the settlement agreement demonstrates that the judicial action in these
matters is merely a slap on the wrist. The original settlement proposed to create fund that
amounted to a mere 3% of Facebook’s total net income of $18,485,000,000 in 2019.78 While
this was a good start, the final amended settlement takes the penalties one step further, requiring
Facebook to create an opt-in setting79 and pay an additional $100 million.80 This settlement
furthers the argument that state legislation is better because this agreement is limited to only
members of the class.81 Settlements, unlike a court ruling or decision are not binding as
precedent on potential future litigants. Although the settlement agreement states that Facebook
must set the Face Recognition default to off and “delete all existing face templates for class
members unless Facebook obtains a class member’s express consent.”82 To receive this kind of
consent, Facebook would have to expressly disclose its uses and possession of the face
templates, an unlikely scenario.83 It is not clear whether or not Facebook has followed through,

Bobby Allyn, Judge: Facebook’s $550 Million Settlement In Facial Recognition Case is Not Enough, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO, (July 17, 2020, 11:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/17/892433132/judge -facebooks-550million-settlement-in-facial-recognition-case-is-not-enough.
78 Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Jan. 30, 2020).
79 An opt-in setting is one that requires users to explicating agree to have the respective company collect their data,
rather than the company automatically collecting it.
80 See In re Facebook, at *7.
81 Keep in mind that settlements are not binding, therefore, despite this case seeming like a victory it does not bind
future courts that will likely see this issue again.
82 See In re Facebook, at *8.
83 Id.
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though if they had, this settlement arguably would only be applicable to Illinois residents, and no
other state residents would be required to receive notice of Facebook’s facial template collection,
nor the users express consent to use these facial scans.
The most important aspect of this settlement is that Facebook is required to interpret
“silence or inaction by the user” as the “withholding of consent, and the Face Recognition
function [must] be set on “off” and [the relevant] face templates deleted.”84 This is similar to the
opt-in measure that this Comment will propose, but the judiciary does not have a specific
enforcement branch. The court can issue fines or bench warrants, but this is not enough
considering the judge themselves cannot directly ensure that the settlement is followed . State
legislative measures should be created to form these private rights of action and create a legally
enforceable measure against social media companies that requires notification of collection, use,
and storage of this data, along with what purposes they are using the data for.
Beyond Facebook, TikTok users have attempted to voice their concerns about the app
tracking and using their facial geometrics for profit without users’ consent.85 It is difficult to
know how much TikTok profits from users’ data because they are a private company that does
not have to legally disclose its financial data in the same way Facebook does to its public
investors. A recent news article shows that “[a] class-action lawsuit accuses TikTok of
collecting and storing users’ biometric data without consent.”86 This suit was “[f]iled in the U.S.
District Court for [the Northern District of California] by guardians for two Illinois [minors] who
used the app.”87 The complaint states that “TikTok violated Illinois’ Biometric Information
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Privacy Act by not informing users that it collected face scans or disclosing its reasons for doing
so.”88 The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of individuals who, when living in Illinois, “used
face filters, face stickers, or the face tracker lens on an image or video of that user’s own face or
whose face appeared in a video” on the TikTok app or the musical.ly app, which merged with
TikTok in 2018.89
With the recent settlement against Facebook, the tidal wave of litigation is growing
against social media companies. As of July 2020, “[t]here are now close to twenty similar class
actions in which Illinois TikTok users have sued under BIPA, with other cases in the Northern
District of Illinois and in the Northern and Central District of California (all such actions
collectively, “TikTok Actions”).” 90 Facebook is not the only social media company coming
under scrutiny by its users demanding reparations for privacy harms they suffered without proper
notice. Further, these users are using both the CCPA and BIPA to attempt to get the courts to
intervene.
2. California’s Privacy Act
In 2018, California followed Illinois’ lead and passed the CCPA. The CCPA gave
consumers more control over data that businesses can collect from them, and the legislation did
not go into effect until January 1, 2020.91 Despite its infancy, over fifty lawsuits have already
been filed.92 The statute requires “companies that sell consumer data to disclose that practice
and give consumers the ability to opt-out of the sale by supplying a link titled ‘Do Not Sell My
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Personal Information’ on the business’s home page . . . known as the right to opt-out,” but for
consumers under the age of 16 parents or guardians must opt-in.93
Facebook has responded to the CCPA with what is known as limited data usage. 94
Facebook introduced this adjustment to its platform in July as a response to California’s
announcement that it would implement strict enforcement starting July 31, 2020.95 Facebook
added this “feature require[ing] simple modification[s] to the existing Facebook PageView pixel
so that Facebook can automatically detect whether or not a user is in California.”96 Specifically,
Facebook’s developers “will need to include a string within the Facebook pixel for
‘dataProcessingOptions’ [ ] allow[ing] business[es] to specify its degree of CCPA compliance.” 97
It appears that the amount of effort to ensure compliance is mounting against social media
companies. Continuously updating algorithmic additions must at some point begin to outweigh
the diminishing benefit of avoiding compliance, and it is only a matter of time until this point is
reached.
Most notably, California passed a modification to the CCPA at the end of the same year
that it became effective, 2020.98 The amendment is known as the California Privacy Rights Act
(“CPRA”), which “greatly expand[s] the CCPA and impose[s] novel obligations on businesses,”
including “grant[ing] consumers new rights, and modify[ing] the CCPA’s enforcement
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provisions.”99 Further, the CPRA expands the exemptions related to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and what is known as de-identified
information.100 Bloomberg Law provides suggestions for how businesses should address the
shifting legal field surrounding increased consumers’ concerns for their privacy.101 Though
Illinois and California have passed expansive legislation, there are two other states with
approaches worth noting.
iii. Texas’ Biometric Privacy Statute
Following Illinois’ lead, Texas enacted legislation in 2009, which specifically prohibits
private companies’ use of certain biometric identifiers.102 This statute does not include a private
right of action, meaning that anyone who is aggrieved may not bring an individual suit. Instead,
aggrieved individuals must show that the “the civil penalty is $25,000” for the state attorney
general consider bringing an action.103 The high-bar for damages demonstrates a significant
hurdle for individuals able to bring their claims to the Texas Attorney General’s office. The
Texas’ statute specifically identifies what a biometric identifier is and limits a person’s ability to
capture a biometric identifier “of an individual for a commercial purpose unless the person: (1)
informs the individual before capturing the biometric identifier; and (2) receives the
individual[’s] consent to capture the biometric identifier.”104

Mark Brennan et al., Insight: California Privacy Rights Act – Key Takeaways for Businesses, BL, (July 15, 2020,
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Despite this law being on the books since 2009, only recently the Texas Attorney General
announced an investigation into Facebook’s use of biometric identifiers. 105 A private right of
action is more effective because it takes the pressure off of public officials who may be
distracted by re-election and the public’s perception of their leadership. Further, a private right
of actions takes the pressure off of taxpayers given that State Attorney General offices are public
functions, which are funded through state funds. Attorney General’s offices, funded through
taxes, do not have to worry about over consumption of taxpayer funds if a private right of action
is available for citizens to seek remedy. Private individuals who want to bring actions against
private companies like Facebook or TikTok may do so under both the Illinois and California
legislation.
iv. Washington States Biometric Law
Washington enacted a business regulation in 2017 that included what a business may not
do with a biometric identifier as it is described within the statute.106 The law does not provide a
private right of action, however. The statute places exclusive enforcement in the Attorney
General of the State of Washington.107 This statute differs from both Texas and Illinois law in
that it does not regulate “the capture of biometric data and instead focuses on the ‘enrolled’ –
‘unenrolled’ dichotomy . . . if an entity does not enroll biometric data in the method proscribed . .
. the act will not impose its notice and consent requirements.”108 This language indicates that the
business must follow the specific method described in the language to fall under the notice and
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consent requirements. Therefore, it is fair to reason that businesses can evade this type of
regulation by simply enrolling biometric data in a manner that is not proscribed by the statute. 109
Washington has recently attempted to amend its law and allow for a “broad private right
of action,” but this amendment failed.110 Despite this failure, the mandate remains that a “person
may not enroll a biometric identifier in a database for commercial purpose, without first
providing notice, obtaining consent or providing a mechanism to prevent the subsequent use of
biometric identifier for commercial purpose.”111
The Washington law as it stands appears weak on its face and not likely to be truly
enforceable against private corporations. This is especially true when one looks at the “broad
security exception,” that allows for “entities that collect and store biometric data in relation to a
‘security purpose’” to be exempted from prosecution under the law. 112 This exception includes
excluding stores tha have video surveillance, but it is not yet clear how broadly this security
exception will go.113 Specifically with regard to mobile devices that store fingerprints or facial
recognition technology for payment methods stored on a device, it is unclear whether this
method would fall under “security purpose.”114
IV. Theories Underlying Default Settings and the Relevance of Nudging
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Below is a description of default settings, in which the author posits that opt-in default
settings are best for facial recognition data collection. The section will describe some social
theories behind “nudging” and why it is important for legislatures and even social media
companies who write these privacy policies to consider the kind of language they contain.
A. Default Settings
The difference between an opt-in and opt-out setting is quite nuanced but creates drastic
differences in the privacy implications for users. An opt-in setting occurs when a company or
entity notifies the user that they would like to collect or use data, and essentially asks if one
agrees. This differs from an opt-out setting, which by default allows the company or entity to
collect data or information from the individual unless they go to their settings and select the
option to not allow this type of collection.
According to the FTC, opting-out means the user may limit the extent that the company
can provide their personal information, and if a user neglects to opt-out the first time he or she
receives a privacy notice, it is never too late.115 Despite this particular article referring to
financial data and privacy that citizens are afforded under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), the definition is still applicable in this
instance because biometric data is still personal information116 to which a user should have the
right to protect.
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Protection “by default [would] require ensuring mechanisms are in place within the
organization to ensure that, by default, only personal data [ ] that is necessary for” 117 a prior,
specifically identified purposes, is collected and remains within the organizations system for a
limited period. This type of limited data collection and storage mirrors the international
standards proposed within the European Union’s privacy legislation.118 Today companies
collecting and tracking users’ personal data such as emails, phone numbers, search bars, and
website history as part of target ad-marketing campaigns is common place.119 There is a stark
difference, however, between collecting the aforementioned data and facial or other biometric
identifiers. The difficulty in attempting to permanently unsubscribe from an email list should be
an indication of the concerns users should have regarding unsubscribing or opting-out of
biometric collection. Creating a new email or putting a phone number on the ‘do not call ‘list is
possible; however, creating a new face or altering biometric identifiers is almost impossible.
Biometric data poses heightened risks because of its uniqueness to the individual and the fact
that the full ramifications of biometric technology are not yet known,120 which provides support
for state legislators to initiate and pass protective measures for citizens’ data now.
B. The Relevance of Nudging to Opt-in Versus Opt-out Settings
The key to understanding the relevance of opt-in versus opt-out settings comes with the
term known as “nudging.” Nudging is something that has come to be “understood as approaches
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that steer people in certain directions while maintaining their freedom of choice.” 121 Further,
nudging is “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.”122 The
term “choice architecture” generally refers to strategically formulating choices that cause
individuals to make specific decisions.123 There are several different types of nudges, but in this
context, we will refer to the proposed default rule as a nudge. The state legislature would have to
be conscious of the potential bias it may impose on social media users through the idea of choice
architecture. Despite this risk of bias, however, requiring social media websites to explain why
users should grant them access to their face templates seems like it would be worth the risk.
Technology is everywhere and it arguably “organizes the world for us – subtly shaping
the ways that we make sense of it.”124 Social media companies should be required to have
default settings that give users the ability to have true freedom of choice—a nudge in the right
direction. Lauren Willis argues that “the use of a default scheme from which consumers can opt
out is premised on three key assumptions.”125 The paper discusses the problem that any “default
will be “sticky,” that “consumers with a true preference for the opt-out position. . . will opt-out,”
and “where a firm opposes the default position . . . [it] will be forced to explain it in the course of
trying to convince consumers to opt-out, resulting in well-informed decisions by consumers.”126
It is important to understand the differences between the ideas of language being too sticky or
slippery.
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The concept of a setting being “too sticky,” refers to a situation where “consumers stick
with the default even though they would opt out were they well-informed,”127 and comes down
to a lack of information. To avoid a setting that is too sticky, state legislation should require
companies to include details on what information is being used, if it is being stored, the benefit
to the user of having the setting on, and whether the company has the right to sell this data to a
third-party. The goal for this kind of information would be that it is presented in a
straightforward, easy to understand manner, rather than with nuanced and difficult language of
which Willis warns against.128
The concept of a setting being too slippery means that “consumers opt out even though
they would prefer the default position were they well-informed.”129 Again, this theoretical idea
about default settings comes down to the level of information provided to the consumer when
they have the option to allow the company to collect the data or not. Further, Willis argues that
default settings are pointless without “robust competition over protect[ing] consumers[’] privacy
develops in the marketplace—a doubtful prospect—firms will generally prefer for consumers to
be in the”130 position, which best suits the companies’ interests. This verbiage creates an opt-out
setting but provides only minimal information. Even if companies are required to create these
default settings, it is likely that consumers will not “necessarily be making well-informed
decisions.”131 This idea comes down to what kind of language policymakers use to create these
laws.
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Policymakers at the federal as oppose to state level, typically will not address the full
scope of default settings necessary to enable citizens to be well-informed and will likely not
address the “granularity of opt-out choices.”132 Federal laws tend to be watered down and may
be incapable of requiring the kind of specificity with which companies must inform their
users.133 In essence, it appears that policy makers do not have the capacity to address the
nuances necessary to create default settings through law that would create the best privacy
possible for their citizens. This is one reason why that this Comment proposes state legislation,
which can provide the most comprehensive legislation without the red -tape posed by federal
legislation.134
It is important to understand the users’ economic behavior when it comes to our online
presence. In particular, one survey found that 84% would rather receive targeted advertising in
exchange for content than to pay for that content with money, but 93% of participants said “they
would opt-in to a Don’t-Track-Me position if given the choice.”135 This survey shows that a
large majority of consumers will opt-in, if given the option, which will benefit companies. This
does not, however, diminish the need to give them informed consent or adequacy of
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understanding the choices they have. Consumers deserve privacy, and though Willis’s article is
not specific to biometric data, it shows that data overall requires user consent and understanding.
Turning the attention back to social media companies, Facebook made a recent
announcement about its policy of transparency that begins to track the kind of disclosures social
media companies should regularly make. Facebook announced in September of 2019 that they
would require all settings for new and existing users to be automatically turned off, requiring
each user to “opt-in.”136 Despite this announcement, there appears to be confusion surrounding
what kind of setting is actually in place. For example, ABC 6 News reported the default setting
as an ability for users to opt-out of the facial recognition program within Facebook. 137 Optingout versus opting-in is a crucial difference, as one indicates that the company may use the
information unless the user tells them not to, versus the company having to ask permission to
gather information in the first place.138 The ABC 6 report and the recent court settlement
highlight the confusion.
The current settlement “requires Facebook to automatically turn class members’ facial
recognition settings to ‘off’ and delete any face templates it may have . . . unless that individual
affirmatively opts in . . . after receiving BIPA-complaint disclosures in a standalone
document.”139 This settlement was reached in 2020 and Facebook’s 2019 announcement that it
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will take measures towards opting-in and consent were yet to be realized. Facebook’s reaction in
light of pending litigation pressures from a single piece of state legislation demonstrates the
benefit of creating legally cognizable harm surrounding biometric data for which the judiciary
can provide relief. Judicial enforcement of one settlement is not enough, and action on behalf of
several state legislatures in key market states is necessary to create much needed protections.
In conclusion, rather than giving companies an incentive to facilitate consumer exercise
of informed choice, current default settings leave firms with opportunities to play on consumer
biases or confuse consumers into sticking with or opting-out of the default. Opt-in default
settings for biometric information are better because it allows users to control the information
that companies collect about them in an ideal data protection regimes.140 These kinds of regimes
though, are essentially impossible where there are, what is called a “constructed environment.”141
This kind of environment is one where choices are constrained because they are specifically
engineered to create feelings of being overwhelmed by options and forced into defaulted
complacency.142 This Comment argues that an opt-in setting for biometric data is ideal because
of the literature surrounding the choice architecture and the virtual impossibility of creating an
actual choice.
V. State Action Over Federal Inaction and Inefficiency
This section will argue that federal legislation is too slow, and the current oversight by
federal agencies like the FTC is ineffective in preventing the misuse of users’ biometric data. In
particular the focus is on Facebook and its most recent FTC order. Next a discussion of how past
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federal biometric bills have failed ensues. Finally, Part V concludes with a proposed outline of
what state legislatures should include in their bills based off of Illinois’ BIPA and the CPRA.
A. The FTC’s Battle with Facebook
The FTC, as of September 15, 2020, appears to be “gearing up to file a possible antitrust
lawsuit against Facebook . . . challenging the company’s dominant position in social media.”143
In light of this potential prosecutorial action, Facebook’s sway through lobbying groups and
other tactics may be waning.144 Currently, the only means for the federal government to pursue
private companies like Facebook and TikTok for non-consensual use of an individual’s data is
through the Consumer Protection Bureau. As it stands to the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) under the Bureau of Consumer Protection does not specifically list biometric data
privacy as part of its duties.145 This is further evidence of state legislatures’ need to stand up
rather than looking to the federal regulatory arm.
Given that there is no federal statute or regulatory body to either force companies to
protect or enforce this protection with regard to biometric data, and the rise of litigation there is
an obvious void in the regulatory scheme. The FTC has attempted to step into this gap through
civil suits against companies suspected of violating consumer privacy rights generally. Most
recently, the FTC has issued its second round of orders against Facebook. 146 This new round
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penalizes Facebook for violating the first order in 2012. 147 Further, it requires Facebook to
implement a series of measures to strengthen privacy protections and a $5 billion fine.148 This
2019 order and fine come as a result of Facebook failing to follow the FTC’s 2012 settlement
order and not in light of new information or wanting Facebook to heighten its protections for
consumers.149 In light of the fact that this is the second time that the FTC has attempted to rein
in Facebook’s social-media regime, perhaps Facebook will follow the stipulations order.
According to Facebook’s third quarter earnings call, CEO Mark Zuckerberg formally
announced that Facebook “entered into a settlement with the FTC to make structural changes and
build a rigorous privacy program that will set a new standard for our industry.” 150 Zuckerberg
appears to be taking this second round of FTC stipulations into account as the company has put
in place new privacy policies.151 The FTC stipulations require Facebook to establish a
compliance officer to oversee the new privacy program as well as “increases outside
oversight.”152 This order will remain in effect for twenty years, which means that the FTC will
‘monitor’ Facebook’s actions to ensure compliance.153 This stipulation included a new demand
for several documents to be turned over to the Department of Justice for review, which could
indicate that this time could be different from the 2012 warning.154 The FTC requirements in the
2019 order demonstrate that the organization is attempting to more strictly regulate Facebook’s
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actions. 155 Specifically, Facebook must “exercise greater oversight” with their third-party
vendors and refrain from using data obtained for two-factor authentication for advertising.156
Most notably, the FTC asked Facebook to provide “clear and conspicuous notice of its use of
facial recognition technology, and obtain affirmative express user consent.”157
The Federal regulatory process takes too long, and as the FTC’s multiple attempts to
require Facebook to change demonstrates, is inefficient. 158 The FTC is in charge of protecting
consumer data, yet it had to issue multiple ‘warnings’ and fines in order for the largest social
media company Facebook to initiate a change to their policy, finally. This further demonstrates
the need for state legislation, as the recent BIPA settlement shows that the legislation was better
able to protect its resident consumers than the FTC was at protecting citizens as a whole.
Looking beyond the individual federal enforcement branches, the federal legislative
process itself takes too long.159 In 2017 Congress attempted to pass the “Consumer Privacy
Protection Act of 2017.”160 The two key measures of this bill included an “amend[ment] to the
federal criminal code [making] it a crime to intentionally and willfully conceal knowledge of a
[data] security breach” resulting in at least $1,000 harm to any individual, and required “certain
commercial entities to implement a comprehensive consumer privacy and data security
program.”161 While this bill may have been a step in the right direction, it was proposed in 2017,
“read twice, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary,” where it has remained.162 Further,
based on the language of the first requirement, the bill merely highlighted the risk of data
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security breaches, and did not necessarily advocate for private companies’ potential misuse of
that data internally. Federal legislation takes too long to pass and to satisfy the majority of
Congressional representatives tends to be overly broad or vague. Though “[t]he broader the
default scope, the more easily it can be understood,” it is less likely that it will “satisfy most
consumer preferences.”163 Looking at the ability to satisfy consumer preferences in relation to
federal regulations, most industries that are heavily federally regulated advocate for federal
regulations because they know that it will allow the most loop-holes.164
B. Concerns About Lack of Uniform Law
If the nation begins to see sweeping state legislation providing for a private right of
action, as Illinois’ BIPA does, then there may be an argument that this would create a lack of
uniformity of law. This idea of uniform law throughout the United States dates back to the
framers’ intention that the Federal Government have the power to issue such “laws as to create
unity.”165 This concern would not be relevant, however, if states like New York and New Jersey,
with robust market places follow California and Illinois’s lead with regard to biometric privacy.
In theory, the populational representation of these states would place pressure on social media
companies to create a national standard that is heightened to the state with the most robust
laws.166
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The first instance of this happening can be seen through Facebook’s reaction to the
CCPA. For example, with the passage of the CCPA, Facebook updated their websites code to
recognize when a user is a California resident.167 Then updated their specified settings to include
what is called Limited Data Usage (“LDU”). 168 Facebook is able to tailor their policies to the
geo-location of their user’s states regulatory requirements.169 This Comment poses the theory,
however, that if enough states with as robust a market as California begin to pass regulation
requiring increased biometric data protection and notification, at some point the costs of the
company changing each individual setting should outweigh the small benefit of the continued
use of data in other portions of the United States.170 Continually having to change their user
policies and code to adapt to individualized state legislation would eventually meet the economic
tipping point and ideally cause Facebook and other social media companies like TikTok and
Instagram to make company-wide shifts.171
Though some concerns about a lack of uniformity of law have been posed, some scholars
agree that a federal bill would be too watered down to create effective change. 172 Looking at the
current global landscape, scholars have begun to argue that the European Union’s (“EU”) recent
comprehensive legislation might spur the United States into introducing increased biometric data
protections. This speculative measure, however, if done through federal legislation “seems
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destined to be a watered-down version of the GDPR, [General Data Protection Regulation],
given the trans-Atlantic differences in rights, cultures, commitments, and regulatory appetites” to
have the faintest chance of passing.173 This difficulty of passing comprehensive federal bills
without watering down their potency further emphasizes the need for state legislation because
states are better positioned to set the stringency that is best suitable for their respective
constituents. A watered down, less effective and less specific version of biometric legislation at
the federal level, though creating the “uniformity of law” the founders sought 174 , is not what the
states need to tackle reigning social media giants. These social media companies require specific
and harsh legislation because these companies have gone largely unchecked until recently. 175
Further, the United States is now known globally for “accommodating the internet and digital
technologies into [laws already in] existence and often poorly fitting legal structures.” 176
With the changes of both American’s feelings towards privacy, where citizens are
expressing increased levels of privacy concerns,177 and rapid enhancement of facial recognition
technology,178 now is the time for legislators to step in. The new privacy norm is that about six
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in ten U.S. “adults say that they do not think it is possible to go through daily life without having
data collected about them.”179 Despite this alarming number, this survey did not pose the
specific question in regards to whether or not citizens are aware that their facial geometry is
being scanned, tracked, and stored 180 —setting aside those users who have taken Facebook and
Instagram to court. A citizen who lacks knowledge about how their data is used or even that it is
being used, is not the same thing as providing passive consent, and social media companies
should not continue unregulated in using and abusing users’ biometric data.
Examples of specific acts that social media companies like Facebook, Instagram, and
TikTok do without users’ explicit knowledge includes tracking and creating user online profiles,
and using those profiles to predict certain behaviors or attitudes, then selling this data
compilation for profit.181 The data is also being shared globally, not just within the specific state,
or even region where that person is located. For example, “if Facebook places cookies on [an]
EU citizens computer for tracking their usage history to provide personal advertisements to
them,” the General Data Protection Regulation passed in the European Union would protect that
consumer.182 This regulation likely would also extend to certain biometric identifiers that fall
under these categories as well. A major component of this law “is meant to deter companies
from overreaching their grasp on individual consumers.”183 The ultimate achievement of the
EU’s sweeping regulations, however, was likely not intended but may “force privacy standards
all over the world to rise up to a set standard.”184
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While it is hopeful that this legislation will cause private companies to switch their
United States privacy policies, it is not likely. Facebook and other social media companies, like
TikTok, provide separate privacy policies dependent on what country you are in. It is much
easier, however, to separate out privacy policies and practices by country, as opposed to on a
state-by-state basis as the current United States landscape is transforming into. Companies now
would not only have to provide separate privacy policies for each respective state, but coding
within each sites algorithm that accounts for each user’s geo-location, then the respective
biometric data privacy statute. At what point does this become too much work? Alternatively,
looking at this from a practical business perspective, at what point does the risk of litigation
outweigh the potential profits that companies may gain from using these data points?185
C. Overview of Proposed Legislation
This Comment proposes state legislation, similar to both Illinois and California, that
requires all social media companies to provide users with a simple, clear, outline of how their
biometric data has been used, if it has been stored, how long it will be stored, the method for
deleting and protecting this data, and allow each user the option of opting-in to the companies
use after being fully informed. The legislation would not specifically name Facebook but would
provide users with seeking a remedy for the conduct of Facebook within their given state of
residency. Affirmative consent is important as opposed to passive consent, which is represented
by merely clicking “I Agree” when a user first creates a profile. The idea of citizens working
together to demand change from a company is known as market pressure. In theory, this could
work, but in reality this is impractical. Arguments for market pressures to force transparency
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and increase competition have been proposed,186 but this Comment will focus on the state
legislatures ability to protect citizens.
Specifically looking at the importance of statutory damanges it is important to highlight a
hallmark privacy case Clapper v. Amnesty International.187 The Court in this case held that the
plaintiffs had no standing to sue because they lacked proof of an injury. 188 Given that proving
the injury is such a high burden, this Comment proposes statutory damages to relieve some of the
burden of proving the exact amount claimed and encourage attorneys with contingent fees to take
these cases. Specifically, the class actions against Facebook and TikTok demonstrate the kind of
high settlements that cause actions to be brought.189 These class actions help to not only call to
attention the wrongs of social media companies, but also should act as notice to state legislators
in other states to allow private rights of actions for their citizens to seek relief.
Each of these state biometric data laws provides important details for state legislatures to
keep in mind. First, that Illinois offers the best template for state legislatures to follow due to
their expansive private right of action and statutory damage requirements. 190 Second, that as the
Washington and Texas laws show a reliance on State Attorney Generals to bring cases will result
in only the largest of violations being brought forward. 191 Third, though the CCPA provides a
private right of action, it is limited in comparison to BIPA.192 BIPA is the best template
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primarily due to the fact that it has demonstrated its strength in the recent settlement agreement
against Facebook—the industry leader for social media companies. 193
While the world watches to see what effect the European Union’s data protection and
“privacy law [has] in the next few years in countries such as the US and China because of the
GDPR on their business[es],”194 this article hopes to see pressure from increased state legislation
push social media companies into compliance with a national, top-notch standard of notice and
consent. Monajemi suggests that the increased privacy requirements will place pressure on
companies to shift privacy practices but argues that this pressure will be felt by federal rather
than state governments to meet the EU’s muster.
VII. Conclusion
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time to
time to define anew the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political,
social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the new demands of society. 195
Justice Brandeis’s words are especially applicable today with the rapid changes and
advancements in facial recognition technology and social media’s use of it. We as a society
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must “define anew” the exact nature and extent of the extent of protections offered to U.S.
citizens, and state legislatures are best positioned to strike.
Pressure continues to mount on social media companies. From the recent settlement with
Facebook to the passage of the CCPA and flood of lawsuits that followed, the time for regulation
is now. These judicial settlements and increased use of the judiciary shows that the regime of
unrestricted, unauthorized access to our biometric data is ceding. State legislation is the best
method for protecting citizens and social media users from unwanted biometric data scans and
storage of this data because state legislatures do not face the same pressures from powerful
lobbying groups nor campaign donations that Congress may face. State legislatures are also able
to create more exacting laws with expediency in proposal, adoption and implementation.
Moving state-by-state appears to be working as evidenced by the flood of litigation
California has seen with the CCPA coming into effect this year, and the increased pressure on
the FTC to act against Facebook with the settlement from BIPA. Therefore, other states should
adopt similar legislation to force social media companies to make national changes, rather than
regional exceptions in their respective privacy policies and algorithms. Protection of biometric
data is a new right, which demands recognition and protection by state legislators.
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